LIST OF TABLES
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-Mississippi) in the Republican radio address (response to the President's radio address), January 24, 1998 Drug trafficking, use, abuse, and the accompanying violence and crime are eroding the very fabric of American society. Our children are being targeted. If the leaders of our nation are not vigilant today, succeeding generations will never have the opportunity to realize the dreams that we and our forefathers envisioned for them. It is in America's best interest to not only combat but defeat the drug problem. This paper proposes that the root cause of drug proliferation in our country is supply. Our inability to interdict the supply lines is the principal failure of our national drug control strategy.
Furthermore, this study recommends that we take the additional step to turn narcotics interdiction over to the United States
Military.
Vital National Interest
In working our way through the strategy formulation paradigm, the first consideration must be given to national values. Many argue that the status quo with respect to drug use and abuse in our nation today runs counter to our national values (See Table 1 ). Secondly, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, dated May 1997, states that:
. . . the goal of the national security strategy is to ensure the protection of our nation's fundamental and enduring needs: protect the lives and safety of Americans; maintain the sovereignty of the United States, with its values, institutions and territory intact; and provide for the prosperity of the nation and its people. 1 Defense of the homeland, national economic well-being, and the promotion of values, three of our four categories of national security interest, are affected by the uncontrolled influx of drugs across our borders. Our government must demonstrate the capability to defend its citizens from this undesired criminal activity. Drug use and abuse damage the work environment, bluecollar and white-collar alike, and alter the dynamics of our economy.
. Finally, drug use and abuse are counter to the "Great Society", "City on a Hill", "Kinder, Gentler", and "Thousand . . .the majority (64%) of Americans feel that more money should be spent on stopping drugs from coming into the United States from foreign countries. There also seems to be support for the theory that reducing the supply is a more effective means than reducing the desire.
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When asked to say which of five major drug strategies they feel would be most effective in terms of where money should be spent to fight the war on drugs, no single strategy is endorsed by a majority of adults. However, government interdiction to reduce the supply of drugs entering the United States is supported by the greatest number (31%) of Americans (See Table 2 ). 5 It is time that global leaders in general and the presidents of the United States and Mexico in particular, realize that drug education and demand-reduction are fleeting solutions. They must be viewed as spokes, but the hub of the wheel is interdiction. But are drug and narcotics-related violations of our national interest vital? Again, our national security strategy says that our vital interests include "the physical security of our territory..., the safety of our citizens, and our economic well-being." 6 Furthermore, and perhaps most convincingly, "We will do whatever it takes to defend these interests, includingwhen necessary -using our military might unilaterally and
It is precisely the use of this military might that this paper suggests we expand now.
Legality?
The Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 is the law that is most frequently invoked by those who argue that it is illegal for the nation's military to be involved in drug interdiction and the arrest of drug traffickers. The act provides:
USE OF ARMY AND AIR FORCE AS POSSE COMITATUS Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 8 This key legal precedent, which on more than one occasion has precluded the national command authority (NCA) from using military assets to address domestic issues, was passed in 1878 to deal with "reconstruction era abuses, culminating in the use of federal troops to police polling stations in Southern states (some say to influence the outcome of the presidential election of 1876) . " . ..providing information collected during the normal course of military operations; the use of military equipment and facilities; allowing military personnel to operate and maintain that equipment provided; and finally the training and advising of civilian law enforcement. The amended act stopped short of U.S. military personnel participating in search, seizure, and arrest activities. Additionally, it provided two caveats to support: assistance would not interfere with military readiness or preparedness and there would be no direct participation by military forces in interdiction. 12 It is precisely this direct participation by military forces in interdiction that is missing from our nation's drug control strategy. We are not using all of the tools available in our kit-bag and we have not put the teeth and the muscle behind our rhetoric.
Even with the more lenient provisions offered in Public Law 97-86, the applicability of the Posse Comitatus Act in dealing with military support of counter-drug operations is no longer relevant. It is not appropriate to invoke the provisions of the act and relate them to drug-related searches and seizures that are made to protect our national borders and American citizens.
The premise for which the act was written still has merit.
Obviously, an unacceptable condition arose during the recovery from Hurricane Andrew in Florida when uniformed soldiers were used to erect tents to be used as polling places during a local election. This event recalled the conditions that existed in 1878 when the Posse Comitatus Act was passed. Soldiers cannot be allowed, intentionally or unintentionally by their uniformed presence, to influence the outcome of any election.
Our legislators should act now to amend the Posse Comitatus
Act. This action is required to allow our active and reserve military forces to conduct searches and seizures, outside our nation's physical borders (in international airspace and waters as well as within our own territorial airspace and waters), and to facilitate more active participation in the war on drugs.
Such an amendment could be designed on the premise that the Posse Comitatus Act was never intended to be applied to actions that take place outside our national borders. At our boundaries and inside those boundaries, the Immigration and Naturalization Service, the Drug Enforcement Agency, the U.S. Customs Service, and various police organizations can operate within the parameters of their regulatory search and seizure requirements.
Quite simply, it is time to give our military more authority to assist federal and local law enforcement agencies in securing our borders from illegal entry and narco-trafficking.
Having argued why the limiting Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 is outdated and irrelevant, now is the time to more thoroughly revise/replace that law.
Military Involvement -Rules of Engagement
Perhaps the solution to the dilemma posed by the continued presence of the Posse Comitatus Act resides in the creation of a set of dynamic Rules of Engagement(ROE) for military forces assigned counter-drug responsibilities. The ability to search and seize is inextricably tied to the use of deadly force, particularly when it comes to the role of the military.
In the worst-case ROE example, a U.S. Air Force fighter aircraft pulls beside a civilian or commercial aircraft of a type frequently used to transport narcotics. In this scenario, the civilian aircraft's radio is inoperative, the fighter is unable to hail or communicate with the civilian, the civilian aircraft 
Current Operations
Our current national drug control strategy has five strategic goals, each with a set of supporting objectives. They are as follows: 
Shifting the Emphasis -Military Involvement
Although the crime and drug use rates are down marginally across the entire nation, they are still at unacceptable levels. Success of the attack on drugs in transit will require sustained deployment of appropriately trained and equipped members of the U.S. armed forces and substantially improved cooperation between the armed forces and U.S. law enforcement agencies. The substantial increase in military participation in the attack on drugs in transit is intended to be in addition to, rather than in place of, Federal law enforcement agencies' efforts. However, it is also apparent that seizures declined considerably, returning to 1990 levels, in 1995 and 1996. More than eight of every ten Americans responded that reducing illegal drug use among children and adolescents is an extremely important area demanding tax dollars. (Table 4) 26 Table 4 Importance of National Concerns in Terms of Where Tax Dollars Should be Spent
Reducing violent crime 84%
Reducing illegal drug use among children/adolescents 82%
Educational opportunities for children 82%
Health insurance or low cost health care 66%
Reducing drunk driving 63%
Reducing illegal drug use among adults 57%
Reducing unemployment 55%
Gun Control 36%
Source: The Gallup Organization, Consult with America Office of National Drug Control Policy, March 1996
Campaign Planning and Execution
In implementing this proposed strategy and making the change to a greater role for the military in drug interdiction, our national command authority must allow the JCS to plan in an unconstrained environment. Military planners must be able to consider all available resources and assets and then have the final plan reviewed and approved by the NCA.
The second leg of the recommended strategy -border security and military responsibility for drug interdiction -correctly prioritizes and resources our drug war efforts. For too long our policies have been passive and reactive -spending 35% of the ONDCP budget on the reduction of drug-related crime and violence.
We need new initiatives and proactive efforts to stop the flow of drugs at and outside of.our borders (Table 5) . Table 5 Agreement with Statements About Drug Strategies
More money should be spent on stopping drugs from coming into the U.S. from foreign countries 64%
We should have more drug treatment available to reduce drug use 51 %
If the money spent on building prisons for drug users were spent on prevention and rehabilitation, there would be significantly less crime 38%
Harsh criminal penalties for using illegal drugs are an effective means of drug prevention 32%
We should have more severe penalties for drug users than for people who sell drugs 25% Tellingly, the ONDCP's National Drug Control Strategy declares, "unless we shield our borders from the flow of illegal drugs, the United States will never stem the tide of drug abuse.
Interdiction is the key to stopping drugs from crossing our borders and reaching our neighborhoods." Our ability to interdict illegal drugs is challenged by the volume of drug traffic and the ease with which traffickers have switched modes and routes. Efforts to interrupt the flow of drugs must be supported by timely and predictive intelligence that is well-coordinated and responsive to changing trafficking patterns. necessary to be effective.
Assessina the Benefits

Analyzing the Ends. Ways, and Means
It is beneficial to next assess how suitable, feasible, and acceptable this recommended course of action is measured against ends-ways-means in the strategic-operational-tactical context.
The end our nation pursues is the total elimination of the drug element from our society. Current presidential and ONDCP goals are mis-placed and will never achieve this desired end state.
This paper argues the only way our nation will reach this end state is to generate and maintain a commitment to the ways and means of a massive drug interdiction campaign. Nationallevel (NCA/JCS) planning accompanied by CINC-level planning and execution, securing our borders, and the international waters and airspace surrounding them, provide the only truly effective ways to accomplish the stated strategy. Finally, the American people and their leaders must commit the resources (means) to accomplish the desired objectives. These resources include tax dollars, personnel, equipment, time, and sustained commitment. We have finally balanced the federal budget and expect a surplus in the next few years. If we commit these resources, this strategy will be effective.
Strategically, we are very close to the mark. Our ONDCP has clearly articulated five sound goals. In the strategic arena, the change we must make deals with mind-set and priorities.
Education is not enough. We must elevate "Goal 4: Shield America's air, land, and sea frontiers from the drug threat" to the Number 1 priority.
Operationally, the creation of an additional area of responsibility for an additional unified commander-in-chief will encompass United States territorial waters and airspace as well as the international waters and airspace through which illegal narcotics transit to reach our sovereign soil. Adequately resourced, the Drug Interdiction CINC can design and execute an aggressive campaign plan.
On the tactical battlefield in the CINC's AOR, he will have the force package, composed of elements of all of the services, required to defeat the threat and accomplish the mission. U.S.
Armed Forces, equipped with all of the capabilities necessary, employing a measured set of Rules of Engagement, can acquire, target, and, if necessary, destroy inbound narcotics, traffickers, and their means of transportation.
Does this proposal, then, meet the requirements for strategy formulation? We have defined the ends, settled on the ways, and set aside the means necessary to stay the course. Furthermore, we have redesigned the goals at the strategic level, created a headquarters to oversee campaign planning and execution at the operational level, and made available the forces and ROE necessary for success at the tactical level. This strategy is most certainly suitable, feasible, and acceptable.
In conclusion, our current interdiction strategy has proven to be ineffective. Less than 35% of available, in-transit drugs are being seized. We are losing the war on drugs. To win, we must turn interdiction over to the military and create a new unified command charged with this responsibility. We must tighten our borders and stop the flow of narcotics to our citizens and our children...it is a vital national interest.
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